Real Hero Report | October 2019 | 21
Paul, SFC Stephen, SSG Will, SSG Mike, and SSG Chad. The
Alpha Team, had only a few minutes to prepare their gear,
tailoring them to be put on donkeys. Some gear was cut to remain
with Bravo Team which would stay behind at the base camp until
more horses could be obtained. Dostum then rode off towards the
village of Dehi, leaving the Alpha Team members to follow with a
10-man NA security element, riding horseback for four hours into
the mountains. All members of the ODA, except Nutsch, were
time in their lives. None of the NA security element could speak
English or any language the ODA spoke, and the ODA members
only could speak “caveman” Russian, Arabic, and French.
manner, executing operations de-centrally. Alpha Team would
continue to build rapport, conduct the area assessment, and
best rapport builder the team could demonstrate to Dostum.
kilometers from the targets, looking across the Darya Suf Gorge.
Weather conditions made visibility extremely hazy, even with
with CAS were two Taliban Command Posts (CP), six armored
vehicles, two artillery pieces, and more than one hundred troops.
The enemy could be observed straight north of Dostum’s HQ.
They were positioned on a hilltop along the ridgeline.
convince Dostum that the bombings would be more effective if
the team could closer to the enemy. Initially the team was not
permitted to move forward towards the Taliban positions. Dostum
was very concerned about a team member becoming injured. On
can be killed, but not one American can even be injured or you
will leave.” By continually demonstrating U.S. commitment to his
NA forces, eventually this barrier was broken. The ODA was able
to then choose observation post locations at its discretion.
Dostum was very protective of the ODA. Assigning his own
trusted bodyguards as the team member’s personal bodyguards
and sending a small security force of his troops wherever they
traveled. These personal security details were under the threat
of death if anything should happen to the Americans. A joke
between Dostum and the ODA was that detachment members
were humanitarian aid workers sent there to help him hand out
“lead” to the Taliban. Over the next several weeks, Dostum was
interviewed over the phone by several journalists. When pressed
about the presence of U.S. Special Forces, on several occasions he
would say he had only a few humanitarian aid workers assisting
his NA troops.
Pennington, commanding the Bravo Team, remained near
Dostum’s logistics base with his team. The Bravo Team
aerial re-supplies for the ODA and NA forces. Re-supplies
included lethal and non-lethal aid, medical supplies, cold weather
gear, and MREs. With only six members of the ODA and the
small security force to secure the urgently-needed supply drops
night drops became increasingly dangerous, as hundreds of local
Afghan civilians would overwhelm the drop zones (DZ), on each
shots across the DZs.
mountain by horseback to linkup with the Alpha Team near
Dostum’s mountain CP. Once at the HQ they were unable to move
again as Dostum logistically could not support them with food,
water, horseback or pack animals. The Bravo Team would remain
future aerial resupplies. The Bravo Team then rode and walked
off the mountain with their gear on pack animals back to Dehi on
base camp, until more horses could be found and purchased or
motorized transportation acquired.
Again, Nutsch, Pennington and MSG Paul conversed and
decided to again split down the detachment in order to gain a
strategic control over the operational area. The Alpha Team split
horseback across the mountains to the village of Dehi and
Dostum’s logistic base where the Bravo Team was located.
Dostum, along with Nutsch, Pennington and the rest of ODA-
in Dehi to discuss his coordinated plan of attack to recapture
MES. At this meeting, ODA-595 met CDRs Atta, Mohahqeq
and scores of other commanders. Over the next several days he
and OGA Reps would meet with these commanders, coordinating
logistical support, and the linkup of ODA with CDR Atta’s
troops near Aq Kobruk in the Balkh Valley. This is said to be the
greatest attribute Special Forces detachment’s offer, the ability to
diplomatically form alliances with other factions or tribes. The
ODA with Dostum at the helm brought three separate factions
Though combat operations continued every day for the
detachment, two key battles helped drive the Taliban further
north. By now the detachment had decentralized into four,
detachment met and briefed him on our campaign the day before.