b. Inadequate remedy.
c. Success on the merits.
84 www.EliteEquestrianMagazine.com EQUINE Lifestyle
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Horses are often unique and, in particular, competition horses which
have received unique training or are from unique bloodlines, cannot merely
replaced with other equines. Therefore, involuntary public sale of those
horses would cause more than economic harm to an owner than m merely
the loss of the value of the horses, because of the unique and irreplaceable
quality of those horses. Thus, an owner seeking to enjoin a stablekeeper’s
lien sale can establish an inadequate remedy at law. See, e.g.: Telemundo
Media v. Mintz, 194 So. 3d 434. 436 (3d DCA 2016 (“Telemundo also established
an inadequate remedy at law and irreparable injury. A monetary
damage award cannot compensate Telemundo for Mintz’s breach because
Mintz’s services are unique and irreplaceable.”) emphasis added.
If the trainer has included training fees in the stablekeeper’s lien claim,
then the lien claim has been inflated beyond the scope of the charges
included in Florida’s permitted stablekeeper’s lien. If an owner can prove
this inflation in the lien claim, then the owner has established a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits as to an improper lien claim. A
lien based on an overly-expanded interpretation of the types of charges
properly subject to lien and public sale is not valid under F.S. §§ 713.65
and 85.031 because:
(1) The plain meaning of the words in F.S. § 713.65 make it clear that such
statute only allows liens for “care and feeding” and not for “training.” See,
e.g. Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando v. MMB Properties, 148 So.3d
810, 812 (5th DCA 2014) (construing the plain meaning of contract terms
when upholding a right to an injunction); and
(2) “A party exercising self-help under Section 85.031(2) does so at
his peril. While the sale passes ownership of the property, it does
not establish the legitimacy of the underlying debt or of the lienor’s
conduct.” Boyd v. Panama City Boat Yard, Inc., 522 So.2d 1058, 1060
(1st DCA 1988) (reversing and remanding a directed verdict against a boat
owner claiming conversion, breach of contract and breach of bailees’ duty
because the statute does not extinguish a property owner’s rights under
Florida lien law) emphasis added.
An owner can also argue that interpretation of F.S. § 713.65, by the
plain meaning of its terms, does not allow for the imposition of a lien by a
stablekeeper upon horses for allegedly unpaid training fees, and therefore
argue that it would serve the public interest for a court to clarify the
distinction between charges properly subject to lien and those not properly
subject to lien.
Therefore, to preserve the status quo, an owner can seek and obtain
a temporary or preliminary injunction against an improper stablekeeper’s
lien in states such as Florida. See Wadsworth Equestrian, LLC v. T.M. Hills
Farms International, Inc., Case No. 2018CA001750-CAA (Circuit Court, 5th
Judicial Circuit, October 18, 2018) (entering temporary and preliminary injunction
enjoining public sale upon claimed lien upon showing of improper
stablekeeper’s lien amount, subject to bond by owner); Planned Parenthood
of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 918, 924 (Fla.
2017) (“The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status
quo while final injunctive relief is sought”). Trainers should therefore be
wary of claiming a lien that is larger than permitted by the relevant law of
the state where the dispute arises.
Defendants are mistaken that F.S. § 713.31 does not apply to a stablekeeper’s
lien claimed pursuant to F.S. § 713.65. Defendants are wrong
because F.S. § 713.31(2)(b) expressly expands the scope of the liens
covered by the Fraudulent Lien Statute beyond Part I by including “or any
lien in any action in which the validity of the lien is an issue.” The entire
subsection (2)(b) thus reads:
The established tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutes be read
in pari materia. Doing so here leads to the logical and inevitable conclusion
that an action for a fraudulent lien under the Fraudulent Lien Statute, by its
express language, is not restricted to only challenges to construction liens
of Part I of Chapter 713.
Statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the literal words
of a statute. A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 1144, 137 So.
157, 159 (1931); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Ross v. Gore,
48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950) (no need for deploying rules of statutory interpretation
if statute is clear on its face). Courts of this state are:
“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for
judicial interpretation. As this Court set forth more than 70 years ago in Van
Pelt v. Hilliard 75 Fla. 792, 798-99, 78 So. 693, 694-95 (1918):
For these reasons, Defendants are mistaken that F.S.§ 713.31 does not
apply and Plaintiff has a right to seek, and the Court the power to declare,
that Defendants’ claim of lien based upon F.S. § 713.65 is fraudulent.
Further, Defendants again seek to debate the issue of the proper scope
of included charges under the claim of lien. DE 22 *7. As stated earlier,
a Motion to Dismiss is not the proper place or time for such debate on the
merits to occur. The Court should not place any weight upon such arguments
at this point in the proceedings.
d. The public interest is served by an injunction.
1. As to Count VI for Violation of the Fraudulent Lien
Statute F.S. § 713.31.
Holly v. Auld, et al., 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)
Continued from page 44
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