Stablekeeper’s Liens and Training Fees Explained
Part I – What Charges May be Properly Included in a Lien?
Many horse trainers not only provide training to the equine athletes in their charge but also provide feed and
care for those horses. However, and contrary to common belief, if the owner of a horse in training does not
pay the trainer, in most states, a trainer cannot claim a lien against the horse for an amount which includes
training fees. In a subsequent article, Part II, we will discuss the remedies available to an owner facing a
fraudulent or improper lien. Here, we discuss the proper scope of a lien, that is, what amounts can be claimed?
1. MOST STATES DO NOT
PERMIT LIENS AGAINST HORSES FOR
TRAINING SERVICES.
Most states do not have specific
lien statutes specifically designating
non-payment of “training fees” as a legal
basis to claim a lien against a horse
and sell the horse to satisfy the lien. The
exceptions are the stablekeeper’s liens
laws of Maryland, West Virginia and
Maryland, which specifically state that
“training” services are properly subject
to lien.
In the remaining states, such as Florida,
which do not specifically list or include
“training” or “training fees” along
with “care and feeding” of a horse, a
trainer should be wary of claiming too
large a lien upon a horse when providing
multiple services to a horse. For
example, Florida’s stablekeepers’ lien
law, otherwise known as an agister’s
lien, does not include a right to lien for
unpaid training fees associated with a
horse. F.S. § 713.65 is specific in that it
provides only for a possessory lien in favor
of the stablekeeper for “the caring
and feeding” of a horse. Id. The statute
does not include “training” in the
categories of services provided. Using
the common meaning of the words
“care and feeding”, the statute does
not allow a trainer to impose a claim of
lien against a horse pursuant to F.S. §
713.65 for unpaid training fees.
a.The plain meaning of the stablekeeper’s
lien law governs.
All states follow the general legal
premise that words within a law, unless
otherwise defined by that law, “‘should
be given their plain and unambiguous
meaning as understood by the ‘manon
Lifestyle
the-street.’” Lenzi v. The Regency
Tower Association, Inc., No. 4D17-2507
EQUINE 38 www.EliteEquestrianMagazine.com Continued on page 78
(4th DCA June 20, 2018), citing Harrington
v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54
So. 3d 999, 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
(quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Castillo, 829 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2002)). “Whether they appear in
a statute or in a declaration of condominium,
words of common usage
should be construed in their plain and
ordinary sense.” Lenzi, supra, citing
Schmidt v. Sherrill, 442 So. 2d 963, 965
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983). See also Matter
of Avella v City of New York, 2017 NY
Slip Op 04383 (June 6, 2017 Court of
Appeals); Imperial Merchant Services,
Inc. v. Hunt, Case No. S163577 (CA
Supreme Court 2009).
Applying those principals and using Florida
as an example, before claiming a
statutory lien under Florida law, a trainer
must conform with the specific statutory
language set forth F.S. § 713.65 as a prerequisite.
Liens beyond that permitted
by the statute are not permitted. For
example, in Turner v. Grifs Western Inc.,
565 So.2d 874, 875 (4th DCA 1990), the
Court concluded that:
In this case the appellees were not
“feeding or caring for the horse” and
admitted that the horses were not
“put in their charge” as required by
the statute. All appellees did was deliver
feed to a barn where the horses
were stabled. Therefore, this lien statute
does not apply. All appellees did
was deliver feed to a barn where the
horses were stabled. Therefore, this
lien statute does not apply. We contrast
section 713.65, which requires
that the animal be put in the charge
of the lienor, with section 713.66, Florida
Statutes (1989), which is entitled
“Liens for feed, etc. for racehorses,
polo ponies and race dogs.” That
statute specifically addresses feed
for such animals and does not require
possession or charge of the animal
by the lienor. In fact, the statute
refers to delivery of the supplies to
the premises where the animals are
located. Were appellant’s horses
racehorses, then appellee would
have a lien under section 713.66.
emphasis added.
The Court therefore dissolved the injunction,
noting that since the lien statute
did not apply, the injunction failed
because the Plaintiff feed store had an
adequate remedy at law available to
recover its money damages. Id., citing
Holiday Pines Property Owners Ass’n,
Inc. v. Wetherington, 557 So.2d 243 (Fla.
4th DCA 1990).
713.65 Liens for care and maintenance of animals.—In favor of all persons feeding or caring for the horse or other animal
of another, including all keepers of livery, sale or feed or feed stables, for feeding or taking care of any horse or other animal
put in their charge; upon such horse or other animal. EE
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