MODIFICATION
OF ALIMONY
By K. Dean Kantaras and Stephanie M. Willis
When parties file for
modification of alimony,
Florida courts have looked
to the date of the Final
Judgment to determine whether an
issue was contemplated at the time, and
therefore, does or does not constitute a
substantial change in circumstances. The
leading case on alimony modification is
Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1992), in
which the Florida Supreme Court detailed
a three-prong test providing fundamental
prerequisites to modification. Specifically,
there must be a finding that: (1) there has
been a substantial change in circumstances;
(2) the change was not contemplated at
the time of final judgment of dissolution;
and (3) the change is sufficient, material,
involuntary, and permanent in nature.
Recently, the Second District Court
of Appeal in Dogoda v. Dogoda, __ So.
3d __, 2017 WL 6027961 (Fla. 2d DCA
2017) addressed whether a change was
contemplated at the time of final judgment.
The case involved a final judgment
of dissolution of marriage entered on
December 30, 2014 based upon a Marital
Settlement Agreement (hereinafter “MSA”)
entered into on September 19, 2014. The
MSA required the Husband to pay the
Wife durational alimony. The Husband
was a firefighter who had been inquiring
regarding retirement options for the
LAARWT
K. Dean Kantaras, Esq.
142 TAMPA BAY MAGAZINE | JULY/AUGUST 2018
MSA was determinative in binding the
parties to their respective contemplations,
the court stopped the clock, thereby
mooting the issue that the final judgment
was not entered for another two-anda
half months, after the Husband had
decided to retire. It is, therefore, imperative
to consider timelines in advance of the
entry of a marital settlement agreement
or final judgment, and to ensure a
client’s expectations, assumptions, and
contemplations are properly reflected in
the record. It is also critical to ensure the
language of a marital settlement agreement
is clear with respect to the date at which
the document becomes binding upon the
parties. 9
EDITOR’S NOTE: K. Dean Kantaras is
the managing partner of K. Dean Kantaras,
P.A., a firm handling cases in family law and
immigration. Mr. Kantaras is board certified
in marital and family law by the Florida Bar.
He has been practicing for over 25 years and is
“A” rated by Martindale-Hubbell. Stephanie
M. Willis, who joined the firm in May 2018,
attended the University of Florida for a
master’s degree in business administration and
Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark
College for law school. Their offices are located
at 3531 Alternate 19, Palm Harbor, 34683,
(727) 781-0000 and 1930 East Bay Drive,
Largo, 33771, kantaraslaw.com.
preceding ten years, but who finally retired
on January 23, 2015, less than a month after
entry of the Final Judgment.
In the appellate court’s analysis, it
interpreted the language of §61.14 Fla.
Stat. to mean that modification depends
on whether the parties’ respective
circumstances changed after they entered
into the agreement. The Second District
deemed it critical that the statute does
not condition modification on the date
the Final Judgment was entered. The
court went on to consider arguments of
equity and reviewed the timeline of events,
determining that the Husband decided
to retire between the date the parties
executed the MSA and the date that the
final judgment was entered. In making
the determination regarding the timing of
Husband’s decision, the court opined that
the parties did not contemplate Husband’s
retirement when they entered into their
agreement. The court found language in
the MSA that the agreement was effective
upon execution by both parties compelling.
In holding that the effective date of the